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ABSTRACT 
 
Option Value and Dynamic Programming Model Estimates 
of Social Security Disability Insurance Application Timing∗  
 
This paper develops dynamic structural models - an option value model and a dynamic 
programming model - of the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) application timing 
decision. We estimate the time to application from the point at which a health condition first 
begins to affect the kind or amount of work that a currently employed person can do. We use 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and restricted access Social Security earnings data for 
estimation. Based on tests of both in-sample and out-of-sample predictive accuracy, our 
option value model performs better than both our dynamic programming model and our 
reduced form hazard model. 
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Introduction 
 
Rapid growth in the number of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) beneficiaries 
in the early 1990s together with a parallel decline in male labor force participation rates 
produced extensive research on the behavioral effects of policy variables on SSDI applications1. 
This empirically based research has primarily used reduced form models to test the importance 
of the effects of size and availability of SSDI benefits on workers’ decisions to leave the labor 
force and apply for benefits. While such models are useful approximations of the relationship 
between past SSDI policies and past application behavior, future policy changes may not yield 
the same reduced form responses. A better theoretical approach to specify how changes in SSDI 
policy will change future behavior is to incorporate explicitly SSDI incentives within a structural 
model. 
In this paper, we develop and test dynamic structural models of the timing to SSDI 
application, once a health condition begins to affect the kind or amount of paid work a currently 
employed worker can do. Workers’ decisions to apply for SSDI can be made at the onset of a 
work limitation or can be postponed. Hence, SSDI application decisions are intrinsically 
dynamic and stochastic. Following the seminal work by Stock and Wise (1990) and Lumsdaine, 
Stock, and Wise (1992) [LSW, hereafter], we investigate this dynamic decision using both option 
value and dynamic programming models in addition to a conventional reduced form hazard 
model. The option value approach was first formalized by LSW to model retirement decisions. 
The option value model is similar in spirit and structure to the dynamic programming model. 
However, it has some analytical differences and is computationally less intensive. Option value 
and dynamic programming models are theoretically more powerful approximations of individual 
behavior than are reduced form specifications. Reduced form models are most appropriate for 
studying the implications of policy changes when the underlying behavioral structure remains 
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unchanged (Lucas, 1976). In contrast, structural models are best when the proposed policy 
change is large enough to significantly alter incentives and individual behavior. By structural 
models, we mean that the estimation of underlying behavioral elasticities is based on a formal 
economic model. A priori, we do not differentiate between the two structural models we use in 
this paper, rather we estimate both and compare them using tests of predictive performance. 
 
Previous Research 
Previous studies have focused on the responsiveness of labor supply to SSDI benefit 
levels or to replacement rates using reduced form models, e.g. Parsons (1980), Haveman and 
Wolfe (1984), Slade (1984), and Bound (1989). These studies show that labor force participation 
is negatively related to SSDI benefit levels, but the magnitude of this relationship remains 
unresolved. Other researchers (Parsons,1991; Bound and Waidmann, 1992; Gruber and Kubik, 
1997), have studied the effects of SSDI acceptance rates on the decline in male labor force 
participation rates. They find that labor force participation rates are negatively related to SSDI 
acceptance rates. Halpern and Hausman (1986) employ a structural estimation approach to 
analyze both these policy variables. Using a two-period model they find that SSDI applications 
are more responsive to changes in the benefit levels than to changes in acceptance rates. Kreider 
(1998) analyzes the effect of wage and eligibility uncertainty on SSDI application decisions. He 
argues that uncertainty about future earnings increases application probabilities as individuals 
may apply for benefits in order to avoid labor market risks. Kreider (1999) uses a structural 
model of SSDI applications, awards, and income to analyze the effect of this program on male 
labor force participation within a lifetime framework. He finds that increases in the level of SSDI 
benefits modestly reduce male labor force participation rates. Kreider and Riphahn (2000) study 
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the determinants of SSDI applications using a semi-parametric discrete factor procedure. They 
use this method to approximate a dynamic optimization model and find that factors such as 
benefit levels, past labor earnings, and benefit eligibility affect application behavior. They also 
find that men and women have significant differences in their responsiveness to policy changes. 
Both Kreider (1999) and Kreider and Riphahn (2000) studies recognize the importance of 
modeling the timing of applications but did not do so. These studies measured application 
elasticity over an eight-year period for a group of health limited workers at risk. We argue that 
this is a useful approximation of one part of the impact of policy changes on caseload, but one 
must model the timing of application over the entire lifetime.  Rust, Buchinsky, and Benitez-
Silva (2003) proposed to develop and estimate a dynamic programming model of SSDI program 
together with the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), and Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI). 
In this paper, we develop dynamic structural models of the SSDI application decision that 
are adaptations of dynamic structural models used to study retirement. Rust (1989), Berkovec 
and Stern (1991), Rust and Phelan (1997), and Heyma (forthcoming) have all used dynamic 
programming models to analyze retirement decisions. Stock and Wise (1990b), based on Stock 
and Wise (1990a), developed an option value retirement model that they argue is close in spirit 
to the dynamic programming rule but more convenient to estimate. The difference between the 
two approaches is that the option value model evaluates the future as the maximum of the 
expected values of utility, whereas the dynamic programming model uses, theoretically 
preferred, the expected value of the maximum, which is necessarily larger. Their option value 
model predicts the age of retirement but underestimates retirement at age 65. They and others 
then provide evidence of the advantages of option value retirement models in a series of papers. 
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LSW finds that option value and dynamic programming models work equally well in predicting 
the effects of a window plan, which is a temporary retirement incentive offered by firms to its 
employees. But they note that the option value model is easier to estimate. A probit specification 
is also estimated for comparison purposes, and they find that both structural models outperform 
probit models.  
Daula and Moffitt (1995) develop a dynamic programming model of army reenlistment 
with two periods. They add a vector of observable variables into their model in order to allow 
such variables to reflect valuations of non-monetary characteristics of application and work 
states. They also use two simpler-to-compute structural models, an option value model and an 
annualized cost of leaving model, and compare their predictions with their dynamic 
programming model. They conclude that all models produce similar predictions in-sample, but 
dynamic programming produces more plausible predictions out-of-sample. 
Our paper which develops a structural model of the decision to apply for SSDI 
contributes to the literature in several ways. The present work focuses on explicit modeling of 
time to application. Once people get on the SSDI rolls, they tend to stay, so the timing of 
application is an important factor in determining the SSDI caseload and program cost. Using 
structural modeling, we show that the policy variables are important for the transition onto the 
SSDI rolls following the onset of a work-limiting condition. Most of the literature using option 
value and dynamic programming models focuses on retirement decisions. We estimate and 
compare option value and dynamic programming models of SSDI application. As a technical 
improvement, we add to the literature by estimating structural models of SSDI for up to 16 
periods (LSW include at most a three-period analysis). Finally, following Daula and Moffitt 
(1995), we also include fixed utility differences as discussed below. 
 5
Dynamic programming and its alternatives 
It can be argued that option value models more closely reflect how individuals actually 
behave. If people intuitively make decisions by comparing the consequences of an application 
this year with an application made in one, two, or five years, then option value models mimic 
that process. Further, option value models are close to dynamic programming models when the 
relevant choice set as opposed to the complete choice set is circumscribed. It is, at the very least, 
an open question as to how well option value models perform in such cases. This is one of the 
issues we explore in this paper. But the main reason to investigate both option value and 
dynamic programming models is that little is known about the success of the two types of models 
in decisions other than retirement. The fact that option value models are more convenient to 
estimate, and thus might simplify more complex models of government programs and the 
simulation of policy changes, is an additional reason to consider that question. However, one 
should note that the results of the comparison we carry out critically depend on the modeling 
assumptions we make. In this paper, our focus is to model the decision whether and when to 
apply for SSDI by workers who experience a work limiting health condition. Therefore, we 
chose to abstract from modeling decisions about returning to work, applying for retirement or 
other programs (such as SSI), SSDI appeals, saving and labor supply choices. Thus, a more 
formal model which incorporates all these aspects could provide different results of comparison 
between the two models.  
Of course similar arguments regarding convenience can be made with respect to the value 
of reduced form models, such as hazard models, which are even less difficult to estimate, 
primarily because they are available in standard computer packages. These reduced form models 
can be criticized for being unable to capture the consequences of a changing structure, but they 
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offer such convenience in practice that they should also be considered. The only way to know 
how reduced form models compete with structural models in their ability to predict the 
behavioral consequences of policy changes is to estimate both reduced form and structural 
models of real and complex problems. This is another issue we explore in this paper, by 
comparing the predictive power of reduced form hazard models to our structural models. 
 
How SSDI Works 
SSDI is a social insurance program that provides benefits based on previous Social 
Security covered employment. The program is financed by the Social Security payroll taxes. In 
December 2000, SSDI paid 5,042,334 disabled workers an average monthly benefit of $786 
(U.S. Social Security Administration, 2001). Here we provide a brief overview of SSDI program 
rules. A much fuller description can be found in the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social 
Security Bulletin. 
To be eligible for SSDI benefits workers must be judged to have a medically 
determinable physical or mental condition that has lasted or is expected to last at least 12 months 
or result in death, and that prevents them from performing any substantial gainful activity (SGA). 
In 2001, earnings of more than $740 a month ordinarily demonstrated that an individual is 
engaged in SGA (The SGA level is automatically adjusted annually based on increases in the 
national average wage index.). They must also be in insured status. Fully insured status depends 
on age at the time of onset and time in Social Security covered employment. They must also 
meet a substantial recent work activity test. In general, this test requires being in Social Security 
covered employment for one-half of the quarters over the previous 10 years.  
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Successful applicants start to receive their monthly benefits (Primary Insurance Amount, 
PIA) following a five month non-work period. This is the statutory waiting period before 
benefits can be received following the onset of disability and during this period applicants need 
to be almost completely withdrawn from the labor market. Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky, Chan, 
Rust, and Sheidvasser (1999) report that the rejection or award process on average takes about 
the same amount of time. PIAs are based on workers’ covered earnings history (Average Indexed 
Monthly Earnings, AIME). Workers can apply for SSDI at any age prior to age 65. Workers with 
a sufficient work history will become eligible for actuarially reduced retirement (Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance, OASI) benefits at age 62 and full OASI benefits at age 65. We consider a 
sample of individuals with work limiting health conditions and assume that everyone in this 
sample who chooses not to apply for SSDI prior to age 62 applies for OASI benefits at age 622. 
SSDI benefits may be terminated for several reasons. In some cases, beneficiaries’ 
conditions improve and they return to work. In other cases, they are found capable of SGA. 
However, beneficiaries rarely return to work, and when they do, their wages are usually lower 
than they were before (see Bound, 1989 and Bound, Burkhauser, and Nichols, 2003 for 
evidence). We assume that once workers get SSDI, they stay on the rolls until they are 
automatically moved to the OASI program at age 65. 
The decision to apply for SSDI is far more difficult than is the decision to apply for 
OASI. Eligibility to both depends on past payroll contributions, however, OASI eligibility is 
based on age and thus is fairly easy to determine whereas eligibility for SSDI is harder to verify. 
Application to SSDI is merely the beginning of a multiple step eligibility process and a 
protracted appeals process which can be long and whose final outcome is uncertain. Thus while a 
probability of acceptance is not required in retirement models, models of SSDI application must 
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include it because applicants may be either rejected or accepted. The probability that an 
application for SSDI is approved has varied dramatically over time and state (see Burkhauser, 
Butler, and Weathers, 2002). In our model, we use the rates of approval by state and year, which 
varied from 25 percent to 75 percent between 1974 and 1993.  
Applicants who are initially rejected for benefits can file appeals at various levels. In 
theory, our setup is adaptable for appeals process as well. However, appeals are not a random 
sample and therefore we choose not to model them in this paper as the estimation would become 
much more complicated. The main focus of this paper is modeling the timing of first application 
for SSDI. For the same reason, we also abstract from returns to work either after being accepted 
or rejected. Bound and Burkhauser (1999) report that accepted individuals rarely return to 
permanent work. Bound (1989) shows that return to work is not likely for the rejected group 
since the relative rewards for returning to work are small.  
 
The Optimal Timing of SSDI Application 
Our option value and dynamic programming models follow LSW. We first specify the 
choice and its potential consequences and then describe the utility functions and the distributions 
of the stochastic elements. 
 
The Option Value Model 
Time is discrete and the horizon is finite. The choice in each period is to continue to work 
or to apply for SSDI as long as one is eligible for these benefits. Thus, an eligible individual can 
either choose to apply for SSDI, or never apply. The consequence of an application is either 
rejection or acceptance and receipt of benefits until retirement or death. If rejected, one may 
 9
either appeal to the decision, or return to work, or not work and live exclusively on non-labor 
income which are not explicitly modeled here. As discussed above, we assume everyone who 
does not apply for SSDI by age 62, retires at age 62. We will specifically model the 
consequences of (1) continued work (no application), (2) application and acceptance, and (3) 
application and rejection. 
Let the current period be t . One can apply for SSDI in period r , tr ≥ . The end period is 
called d , 62 years of age in our case. The probability of surviving to period s  given survival to 
period t , ts ≥ , is )|( tsπ . If one applies for SSDI, the probability of being approved is )(tα , 
and )|( tsπ  and )(tα  are not estimated in the model. Earnings while still working is sW , and 
expected income if one applies for SSDI is sD . Note that, in our model, income in the SSDI 
acceptance state becomes OASI income at age 62. Income is sY  if one is turned down for SSDI, 
and income is sB  if one is accepted. Hereafter, we will not write out all of these terms but use 
sD  to stand for the weighted average of sB  and sY  where the weights are )(tα  and )(1 tα− , 
respectively.  
Let tU  denote the utility function and β  denote the discount factor. We follow LSW in 
specifying that utility is a function of labor earnings and income in the SSDI acceptance state. 
This assumption of forced consumption is clearly restrictive. However, here we focus on the 
SSDI application decision and therefore we abstract from borrowing, saving and consumption 
smoothing issues by assuming incomplete markets as in Rust and Phelan (1997). In general, tU  
includes a systematic predetermined portion and a stochastic, random portion3. As in LSW, we 
assume that income may produce more or less utility after application for SSDI. Application 
timing decision depends on several incentives which consist of factors affecting individual 
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preferences for consumption and leisure, labor earnings, SSDI benefits, health condition, socio-
demographic characteristics, job characteristics and work conditions such as employer 
accommodation following onset, and institutional details of the SSDI program. Further 
discussion on the relevance of these variables for the application timing decision can be found 
below. In this context, at any given period, postponing application may provide higher current 
consumption and higher future potential benefits due to continued labor market activity, but may 
also lead to lower current leisure consumption and higher discomfort from work. Utility in the 
pre-application state is: 
sssW WWU ω
γ += )()( ,                (1) 
and utility in the post-application state is: 
sssD DDU ξκ
γγ += )()( ,               (2) 
where κ  is the utility function parameter which represents the relative value of income in the 
application state to income in the work state. Income in different states may be valued differently 
as no-work state may also imply higher leisure or stigma from application. We assume that this 
parameter is the same, regardless of which outcome (approval or rejection) occurs. As a 
simplification, we chose to approximate the preferences by entering sD  as the argument of the 
post-application state utility function whereas a more complete formal model would define 
preferences over lotteries. Therefore, the utility function parameter γ  only represents risk 
aversion with respect to income variability and not the risk aversion with respect to application 
for the SSDI program. Our simplification can be justified by arguments made by Kreider (1998) 
who finds that the risk aversion with respect to rejection by the program is weak compared to the 
risk aversion with respect to labor earnings variability in the context of SSDI applications. Note 
that, our simplification does not necessarily imply risk neutrality with respect to rejection in our 
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model, as κ  can also be thought as representing the relative value of the lottery (i.e. the 
application state) to the work state. So, if individuals are risk averse with respect to rejection, this 
would imply a relatively lower κ  which would indicate that the non-work income is valued less 
relative to work income due to its uncertainty. A priori, we do not impose any restrictions on κ  
and allow its estimate to take any value. 
The disturbances are assumed to be independent over people and time. One can calculate 
the utility of applying for SSDI payments at various periods. The utility value at time t  of 
applying for SSDI at time tr ≥  is denoted as )(rVt .  
∑∑
=
−
−
=
− +=
d
rs
sD
ts
r
ts
sW
ts
t rDUtsWUtsrV ))(()|()()|()(
1
βπβπ         (3) 
The problem is to maximize )]([ rVE tt  over r . The value of applying for SSDI now (period t ) 
is ∑
=
−=
d
ts
sD
ts
tt tDUtstVE ))(()|())(( βπ . To define the problem more conveniently, define the 
expected value of applying for SSDI in year r  minus the expected value of doing so now as 
)(rGt . 
))(())(()( tVErVErG ttttt −=            (4) 
This is the gain, evaluated at period t , from postponing SSDI application until period r . 
Substituting in the above formulae leads to: 
∑∑∑
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− −+=
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r
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ts Ets νβπ           (5) 
where .sss ξων −=  Thus, )(rGt  consists of the following two parts: 
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Then )(rg t  is the systematic term, the exogenous portion of utility associated with applying for 
SSDI in period r , and )(rtφ  is the stochastic portion of utility. If we define 
)]([maxarg* rVEr tt
r
= , then the person postpones SSDI application if 
0))(())(()( ** >−= tVErVErG ttttt , i.e. if the option value )(
*rGt  is positive. The application 
rule can be explained as follows: one applies for SSDI in period tr >  if  0)( <+ tt sg ν  for 
dsr ≤≤+1  and for rt <∀ ' ,   s∃  such that 0)( '' >+ tt sg ν . 
Thus, one must compute )( jgi  for djit ≤<≤ . This step is recursive and entails Taylor 
expansion of ][ γst XE  unless the analytical expectation exists. LSW use the following Taylor 
series expansion: 
γγ γγ )()1(
2
11][
2
st
st
sts
tst XEXE
XEXEXE













 −
−+≅             (8) 
Therefore, we have 
γγ γγ }{)())(1(
2
11][ sttst XEXVartsXE





 −−+≅             (9) 
LSW does not expand  )( γγκ sD  in a Taylor series on the assumption that the variance of income 
is small in the non-work state. We alter the formulae of LSW by expanding γ][ st XE  
22 )][ln()1(
2
1)ln()1(][ stststsstst XEXEXEEXXEXE −+−+= γγ
γ        (10) 
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and similarly for )( γγκ sD . This expansion increases the accuracy of the approximations and 
improves numerical performance. The next step is to find the maximum )( jg i  over j , this is 
)( *jgi , where 
*j  is the period in which application for SSDI occurs. To calculate the 
likelihood function, we define the following probabilities, which all add to unity: 
• Probability of applying for SSDI at period t : 
))(Pr()Pr( * tt jgtSSDI ν−<==          (11a) 
• Probability of applying for SSDI at period ij > : 
))(,)(Pr()Pr( ** tttt jgigjSSDI νν −<−>==        (11b) 
• Probability that the individual does not apply for SSDI before the end period d : 
))(,)(Pr()Pr( ** ddtt jgjgdSSDI νν −>−>=>        (11c) 
 
The Dynamic Programming Model 
The dynamic programming version of this model uses most of the above equations, but 
somewhat different probability computations. The maximization in the option value model is the 
maximum of the expected values of utility, whereas the maximization in the dynamic 
programming approach is the expected value of the maximum utility. The latter is necessarily 
larger and the option value model understates the expected value of waiting. Therefore, dynamic 
programming is theoretically preferred to option value as it provides a more formal solution to 
the intertemporal utility maximization problem. These two approaches are the same only if the 
maximum utility is guaranteed to be in one certain year, whose expected value is then the 
maximum. Alternatively, imagine a set of nontrivial zero-mean random variables which are not 
perfectly correlated. The maximum expected value of future disturbances (indeed, every 
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expected value) is zero, but the expected maximum exceeds zero, the more so, the more periods 
there are to come. 
At period t , the pre-application and post-application utilities are given by ttW WU ω+)(  
and ttD sDU ξ+))(( , where tω  and tξ  are assumed to be independent over people and time. The 
value function at time t  is given by: 
[ ]












++++= ∑
=
−
+ ])()[|(,)()|1()(max)( 1 tD
d
t
t
ttttWtt DUtErVttWUErV ξτπββπω τ
τ
τ    (12) 
Again we define the probability of survival as )|( tτπ  and we obtain 
{ }ttttt tVrVrV ξω ++= )(,)(max)( 21             (13) 
where )()|1()()( 11 rVEttWUrV tttWt +++= βπ , and 





= ∑
=
− )()|()(2 τ
τ
τ τπβ DUtEtV D
d
t
t
tt  
The application rule here is: if tttt tVrV ξω +<+ )()( 21 , then the individual will apply for 
SSDI in period t , otherwise he or she will continue working. Therefore, the probability of SSDI 
application is ))()(Pr( 21 tttt tVrV ξω +<+ . The calculations in the dynamic programming model 
involve the expected maxima of utility over all possible SSDI application times.  
 
Data 
In this section, we will briefly describe the data sets we use and define the variables in 
our analysis4. Our data come from the first three waves of the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS)5. The HRS is a longitudinal study of the health, wealth, income, and employment of 
primary respondents aged 51-61 in 1992 and secondary respondents (spouses or partners of these 
primary respondents) who were interviewed regardless of their age. Respondents born between 
the years of 1931 and 1941 are considered “age eligible”. Individuals were interviewed 
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biennially, and five waves of data are currently available, three in final form. HRS data can be 
linked to restricted access SSA administrative data6. Three restricted access files are used in this 
study: The HRS Covered Earnings File, The Summary of Earnings and Projected Benefits 
(SEPB) File, and The Wage and Self-Employment Income in Covered and Non-Covered Jobs 
File. 
The HRS is an excellent source of data for analyzing policy issues related to SSDI. It 
includes a module on disability with detailed retrospective questions about SSDI applications 
and awards. Data on individuals' demographic characteristics, labor force participation, 
employment, and health status are also available in separately designed sections. The income 
section provides data on benefits, income, and wealth holdings.  
We also use additional sources of data. The Lewin Group created a Public Use File which 
includes state level data on SSDI and SSI programs as well as state level descriptive variables for 
the years 1974 through 1993. The data contain initial SSDI allowance rates for each state 
computed as the number of people awarded SSDI benefits at the initial state level screening 
process divided by the total number of initial SSDI applications in that state. These data are used 
to form the probabilities of acceptance for SSDI application7. The restricted HRS data set Wave 
1 Geographic Indicators Version 1.0 file provides state geographic identifier variables from HRS 
Wave 1, including information on Wave 1 state of residence and state or country of birth. These 
variables are masked in the public HRS files. We obtained special permission from the HRS staff 
at the ISR at the University of Michigan to be able to merge the geographic state identifier 
variables with the Lewin Group Public Use File on allowance rates8. In our study we need data 
on the probabilities of death for individuals with work limiting health conditions, and for this 
purpose we use life table data provided in Zayatz (1999).  
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We draw our sample from both age eligible and age ineligible persons who reported a 
work limiting health problem in Wave 1 (1992) or Wave 2 (1994) of the HRS as defined by a 
positive response to the question “Do you have an impairment or health problem that limits the 
kind or amount of paid work you can do?” Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky, Chan, Cheidvasser, and 
Rust (forthcoming) show that the self-reported disability measure in HRS is an unbiased 
indicator of the true disability status. In the first wave, 2,717 persons (1,324 men and 1,393 
women) reported that they had such an impairment or health problem9. To this population we 
added 340 persons (140 men and 200 women) who were not in the sample drawn from Wave 1 
but who reported having a work limiting health condition in Wave 2. Of these 3,057, we kept 
those with permanent conditions (impairments expected to last for more than three months) who 
were working for someone else (not self-employed) at the onset of their work limiting health 
condition. This initial screening yielded a sample of 1,653 individuals (924 men and 729 
women). 
Individuals were asked when their condition first began to bother them, and this date is 
used as the onset of the health problem. They were also asked if they applied for SSDI benefits. 
For those who applied, their spell ends at the year of application. SSDI benefit award status can 
be obtained using the income section of the survey. We excluded individuals with a missing 
onset or SSDI application date, or with missing SSDI application or award status information. 
We kept those with an onset date after 1950 and before age 61. Finally, only those who were 
eligible for SSDI benefits in terms of being fully insured in at least one period following onset 
were kept in the final sample. This way, we guarantee that the individuals in our sample whose 
application is rejected are denied SSDI benefits solely due to medical screening results. 
Individuals who became eligible after 1993 were also dropped from the analysis since it was not 
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possible to observe them applying for SSDI. Applying these criteria, our final sample consisted 
of 1,085 individuals (592 men and 493 women). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the 
key variables used in our analysis. 
The time unit in our analysis is a biennial period since the date on SSDI award status and 
income during the survey period are known over biennial periods. We calculate utility from the 
stream of labor earnings in different states and the potential SSDI benefits which would result 
from application for each period of potential application. We construct other inputs which are 
assumed to be exogenous to the model. We include all of these measurements and predictions in 
our option value and dynamic programming models in order to analyze the decision to apply for 
SSDI. 
Table 2 describes the distribution of spell length from onset to application by gender for 
our sample. The first column shows the number of periods since the first period of eligibility 
after the onset of a work limiting health condition. The next five columns show the number of 
men who apply within the period; who are censored within the period; their hazard rate; their 
probability of not applying before the beginning of the period; and the estimated probability 
mass function. The next five columns show these same values for women. The hazard rate is 
greatest in the first period both for men and for women. Nonetheless, only about a quarter of the 
sample apply for SSDI in the first period (first two years following onset). The vast majority of 
workers who experience the onset of a work limiting health condition do not apply for SSDI in 
the first two years but choose to wait to apply. The hazard rate declines after the first period, and 
the longest observed spell is 16 periods (32 years) for men and 15 periods (30 years) for women. 
These life tables demonstrate the substantial variation in spell lengths from onset to application 
but not the reasons for such great variation in outcomes.  
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Explanatory Variables 
All of the following variables are assumed to be exogenous inputs to the model: labor 
earnings, SSDI benefits, socio-demographic variables, the type of health condition, 
accommodation by employers following onset, institutional details of the SSDI and OASI 
programs including the probability of acceptance in the SSDI program, and the probability of 
death. 
Economic Variables. In order to estimate a dynamic programming or option value model, 
it is necessary to estimate future labor earnings and potential benefit levels. Expected real labor 
earnings are intended to capture the opportunity cost of applying for benefits. We need to predict 
labor earnings profiles for each individual for each of the three states we will investigate: (1) no 
application, (2) applied and rejected, and (3) applied and accepted. Our aim is to get good labor 
earnings predictions rather than to estimate a structural model of lifetime earnings. 
Total labor earnings are defined as the sum of covered earnings (covered by OASDI 
taxes) and non-covered wages, and they are adjusted for inflation. Non-covered wages had to be 
imputed in some cases (see Gumus, 2002). Covered earnings are censored at the OASDI taxable 
earnings maximum. To obtain expected values of labor earnings in such cases, we fitted a 
separate log-normal distribution for each year. Once these issues were addressed, an 
autoregression was used to construct expected earnings profiles for the three states described 
above. Following Burkhauser, Butler, Kim, and Weathers (1999), we predicted labor earnings 
using an autoregression which includes: a constant and four lagged values of labor earnings 
alone and interacted with a dummy variable that controlled for having a limitation as to the kind 
or amount of work that one can do; spell length defined as the time lag between each period and 
the first period of eligibility after the onset year; dummies for being in the “applied and rejected 
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group” or the “applied and accepted group”; age, age square, and unemployment rate at each 
period. Once we obtained these three time-varying earnings predictions, we then computed their 
corresponding standard deviations, which we interpret as the uncertainty of the earnings streams 
themselves. 
We, then consider the probability of having zero labor earnings. A probit equation is 
estimated to obtain the predicted probabilities of having zero earnings. A final prediction of labor 
earnings is done by incorporating the predicted values of covered wages from the autoregression, 
the probit, and the predicted values of the non-covered wages. Labor earnings estimation for 
individuals with no administrative records is done in the same way, except that the self-reported 
labor earnings values from the first three waves of the HRS are used instead of the restricted 
access earnings histories. 
Using actual earnings histories (and predictions of them when histories are not available), 
we then compute potential PIAs following SSDI program rules. Details of the PIA computation 
rules can be found in the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin. The 
benefit computation is described in detail in an unpublished data appendix (see Gumus, 2002). 
We need to project SSDI benefit rules for years after 2000, and for this purpose we assumed that 
the institutional details of the SSDI program do not change except as described by statute in 
2000. We assume potential SSDI recipients know and act on this information. Annual SSDI 
benefits are then converted into real 1967 dollars. 
Demographic Variables. We include several demographic variables such as race, 
education, and marital status. These variables reflect labor market attachment and discrimination, 
and thus are relevant to the utility function specifications. 
Health Variables. To be included in our sample, a worker must experience the onset of a 
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work limiting impairment or health problem. But the conditions vary in type and severity. The 
type of condition is included in the HRS data, as well as comorbidity, the presence of other 
mental and physical conditions. These are factors affecting wages and thus the decision to apply 
for SSDI benefits. They will also be considered as factors affecting the utility differences 
between the work and application states. 
Policy Variables. We are interested in several policy variables. Employer accommodation 
is based on a question to the individual asking “if the employer did anything special for the 
individual at onset so that she or he could remain at work”. Accommodation by employers can 
increase the length of time during which an employee stays on a job and does not apply for SSDI 
(Burkhauser et al., 1999; Burkhauser et al., 2002). We include the initial SSDI allowance rates in 
our computation of expected income in the application state. In our econometric model, sW  is 
the labor earnings in the no application state, and sD  is the weighted average of the income for 
the applied and accepted state ( sB ) and the labor earnings for the applied and rejected state ( sY ). 
The weights are given by the initial allowance rates. These rates are available at the state level. 
Higher allowance rates are expected to increase the speed at which individuals apply for SSDI 
benefits. 
 
Option Value and Dynamic Programming Estimation Results 
To estimate our option value model we estimate the systematic utility ( g ) using Taylor 
expansions of the nonlinear functions, and then estimate the univariate or multivariate normal 
likelihood functions for the optimal timing of SSDI application. The latter step produces 
parameters of the utility function and the variances. To estimate our dynamic programming 
model, we first calculate the expected utility of permanent labor market exit at the terminal 
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period d  (age 62). We then calculate the expected maximum utility of applying for SSDI at 
period 1−d  which entails a maximum over two independent disturbances. The probability of 
applying at 1−d  is the probability that the utility of doing so exceeds the utility of waiting. The 
utility of exiting at d  is )( dDd DUV = . That is not a choice at that time since it is the end period. 
The utility of working at 1−d  is the value function )()( 1 dDdW DUWU β+− , where β  is a 
discount factor whose estimation is often not successful in these models. We did not estimate β , 
so this parameter will be set outside the model at a value based on LSW (1992). The utility of 
applying at 1−d  is )()( 1 dDdD DUDU β+−
10. 
All of the utilities involve disturbances and we obtain the probabilities in the following 
way. By assumption, 0.1) thatbeforen applicatio no | at exit Pr( =d . Then, we have 
))()()()(Pr() thatbeforen applicatio no | 1at exit Pr( 11 dDdDdDdW DUDUDUWUd ββ +<+=− −− . 
Define 1−dV  as the value function at 1−d , including both possible paths. We continue this 
backward recursion one more period. The utility of working at 1−d  is 122 )( −−− + dddW VEWU β . 
The utility of applying for SSDI at 2−d  is )()()( 212 dDdDdD DUDUDU ββ ++ −− . Finally, 
)()()(Pr() thatbeforen applicatio no | 2at exit Pr( 1212 −−−− +<+=− dDdDddW DUDUVWUd ββ  
))(2 dD DUβ+ .  
This recursive process continues with ever-growing formulae back to time t , thereby 
defining the probabilities for maximum likelihood or other methods of estimation. Each time the 
value function V  is defined. Eventually one returns to t , the present, and the first probability in 
time, but the last in calculation. The probability that working now in t  has lower utility is the 
probability that choosing next period 1)( ++ tttW VEWU β  has lower utility than applying for SSDI 
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now ))(...)()(( 1 dD
td
tDtD DUDUDU
−
+ +++ ββ . The normal distribution, or indeed most 
distributions, of stochastic utility make this sequential approach difficult, because the maximum 
of a set of random variables has a distribution that is not known in closed form. Therefore, in all 
cases we directly integrate the expected maximum utility numerically. 
Following Daula-Moffitt (1995), we add an observable variable vector x  to the original 
utility functions described in equation (1) and we denote the effects of this vector by δ . Thus, 
the utility function in the work state takes the form εδγ ++= 'xYUW . Here the idea is to 
include some fixed utility differences between the pre-application state and post-application 
state. These are different from the marginal utility differences we imposed originally through κ , 
but they also reflect the relative valuations of the pre-application state and post-application state. 
The x  vector includes years of education, dummies for race, marital status, employer 
accommodation, health conditions and for being a white collar worker. We call the parameters 
corresponding to these variables Daula-Moffitt parameters. Note that positive Daula-Moffitt 
parameters discourage application and negative ones encourage application. 
The parameters of the option value and dynamic programming models to be estimated 
are: κ  (the relative value of income in the non-work state to income in the work state), γ  
(utility function parameter representing risk aversion with respect to income variability where the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion= 1−γ ), β  (discount factor), and δ  (Daula-Moffitt 
parameters). The estimates of the dynamic programming model are obtained by assuming a 
normal distribution for the disturbances. We estimated two versions of the option value model, 
one assuming a normal and the other a Weibull distribution. Table 3 and Table 4 present 
estimation results for men and women, respectively.  
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In Table 3, both our option value and dynamic programming models produce statistically 
significant estimates of κ  and γ , when β  is set equal to 0.85. Estimated γ  is less than one in 
each of the three sets of results and suggests that people are risk averse with respect to income 
variations. The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion (with respect to income 
variability) is about 0.6 in the dynamic programming and about 0.55 and 0.4 in the option value 
models. The estimate of κ  is greater than 1 in the dynamic programming model and the normal 
version of the option value model, which suggests that every dollar earned without work is worth 
more than every dollar earned from work. The estimate is around 1.4 in the dynamic 
programming model. This means that the average man in our sample would be indifferent 
between getting a dollar from work and getting 71 cents under SSDI. Using the Weibull version 
of the option value model, however, we find that the average man values non-work income less 
relative to work income since estimated κ  is smaller than 1 in this model -- it is around 0.411. 
This apparently large difference does not however, have much of an effect on the likelihood or 
other parameters in the model. 
The estimates of the Daula-Moffitt parameters are almost always significant and they are 
similar across models. Additional education or accommodation by employers increases the utility 
of earnings relative to SSDI, discouraging application. Being African-American or being married 
encourages application with one exception: the effect of marital status is positive but small in the 
normal version of the option value model. Being a white collar worker at the onset of a work 
limitation has no statistically significant effect. There is evidence some health conditions lead to 
more rapid application than others. Musculoskeletal conditions, such as back, neck and spine 
problems, or arthritis lead to a relatively longer duration until SSDI application since these 
conditions tend to be chronic. Note, however, that estimated effects are not always statistically 
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significant. On the other hand, cardiovascular conditions, such as stroke or heart attack, lead to 
shorter duration to SSDI application since they tend to be acute. This effect is always statistically 
significant. The omitted category is all other health conditions. All these results are consistent 
with reduced form model findings (see Burkhauser et al., 1999; and Burkhauser et al., 2002). 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for women. The estimated γ  takes a wide range of 
values. It is around 0.5 in the dynamic programming model. It is estimated to be around 1.7 in 
the normal version of the option value model and about 1 in the Weibull version of the option 
value model. This wide range of γ  again does not affect the general nature of the results when 
one looks at the certainty equivalents12. The estimate of κ  is greater than 1 in each model. It is 
about 2.1 in the dynamic programming model and about 2 and 1.8 in the option value models. 
The estimates of the Daula-Moffitt parameters are similar to those of men with a few exceptions. 
Education, marital status, and accommodation are not always significant. Being a white collar 
worker at the onset discourages applications significantly. The effects of arthritis and 
cardiovascular conditions are not significant but the effect of musculoskeletal conditions is 
significant, and it leads to a relatively longer duration until SSDI application. 
 
In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Predictions 
Table 5 and Table 6 show model predictions of SSDI application rates for men and 
women, respectively. The first column of each model gives the predicted application rates, and 
the next column gives the difference between the life table and the predicted rates. The option 
value and dynamic programming models produce similar predictions. Separate analyses of men 
and women change the values but not the general pattern.  
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We test the fitted distributions resulting from the option value and dynamic programming 
models versus the distribution estimated using life table methods in the original data. First, as in 
Table 2, we estimate the hazards of application and the implied distribution of time to application 
in the original data. Then we compare the fitted distributions from option value and dynamic 
programming in Tables 5 and 6 using a multinomial likelihood ratio test based on the discrete 
periods. (The Pearson chi-square goodness of fit is a Taylor Series approximation to this, but we 
use the actual likelihood ratio.) We prefer this metric for comparing predictive power across our 
models to comparing log-likelihood values based on non-nested hypotheses. To avoid small 
cells, we consider the first 15 periods (30 years) for men and the first 11 (22 years) for women. 
The critical values of the chi-square test statistics are 25.0 (5 percent) and 30.6 (1 percent) for 
men and 19.7 (5 percent) and 24.7 (1 percent) for women. The results are as follows: for men, 
dynamic programming normal, 63.3, option value normal, 41.7, option value Weibull, 39.5; for 
women, dynamic programming normal, 41.5, option value normal, 29.5, and option value 
Weibull, 26.6. The conclusions are that none of the fitted distributions are precise, but the option 
value models fit better than the dynamic programming model, and there is little difference 
between the two option value models.  
In all the models, we underestimate the application rate in the first period. In the next 
several periods, we overestimate the application rates. This suggests that individuals who apply 
in the earlier periods are expected to do so, but they are not expected to apply for SSDI 
immediately in the first period. This overapplication problem in the first period resembles the 
problem that LSW encountered with the age 65 retirement effect. As they also point out, this 
kind of a pattern is clearly not related to the earnings or benefit streams (LSW, 1992). In our 
case, it may be due to our inability to identify cases where the onset condition is so severe that no 
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real choice of application is feasible. For some significant minority of workers, the onset 
condition compels immediate application. This overapplication problem in the first period could 
also be the reason for our failure to estimate the discount factor β  (its estimate goes to zero to fit 
early application better). Also after the first period, the predictions are very similar among the 
three sets of results. Both the option value and the dynamic programming models overestimate 
the number of people who choose not to apply for SSDI, but the option value models are more 
accurate.  
We also test out-of-sample predictive performances of our models based on revised data. 
To do so, we randomly divided our data set into two separate samples: two-thirds of the data 
were used for parameter estimation only, and the rest was used to assess the predictive 
performance13. This is done separately for men and women. The distributions of spell length by 
gender for our two-thirds samples are given in Appendix Table 3A. These distributions are very 
similar to those for the original samples. The fitted distributions resulting from the option value 
and dynamic programming models using the two-thirds sample are compared to the distribution 
estimated using life table methods in the one-third sample. These comparisons are presented in 
Tables 7 and 8. We consider the first 12 periods (24 years) for men and the first 11 periods (22 
years) for women. The critical values of the chi-square test statistics are 21.0 (5 percent) and 
26.2 (1 percent), and 19.7 (5 percent) and 24.7 (1 percent), respectively. The test statistics are: 
for men, dynamic programming normal, 24.1, option value normal, 17.5, option value Weibull, 
16.7; for women, dynamic programming normal, 20.9, option value normal, 14.7, and option 
value Weibull, 12.3. The Weibull version of the option value model provides the best out-of-
sample forecasts for both men and women even though there is little difference between the 
Weibull and the normal version of the option value model in terms of predictive performance. 
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Note that, for both models, the test statistic is less than the critical value at the five percent 
significance level for both samples. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
option value model is empirically correct. 
The predicted application rates from the option value and dynamic programming models 
are similar overall. However, the comparison of the predictive performance of the two models 
based on the multinomial likelihood ratio test suggests that the option value model is superior to 
the dynamic programming model. Note that the option value models provide a better fit out-of-
sample than in-sample. This point is very important in the context of policy analysis, since policy 
simulations require models that are able to predict actual responses to future policy changes. 
Given the estimation cost of dynamic programming models, the option value model clearly has 
an additional advantage since it is able to produce good predictions even though it is 
computationally less intensive. This conclusion is similar to that of LSW for retirement who find 
that the more complex dynamic programming model does not produce better predictions than the 
option value model. 
 
Comparison with Hazard Models 
In this section, we discuss hazard model results. The hazard model is based on 
Burkhauser et al. (2002). We define new variables in order to make the hazard specification 
comparable to the option value and dynamic programming approaches. Hazard models are 
explicitly reduced form models of the time until an event occurs, here application for SSDI. In 
the same way that one might compare structural models of wages or macroeconomic outcomes 
with models designed exclusively to make predictions, one can compare hazard models with 
option value and dynamic programming models. A priori, hazard models would be expected to 
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have higher likelihood functions in sample because they impose little in the way of assumptions, 
but they would be suspect as the basis for policy simulations of substantial changes in program 
rules. Because hazard models are available in standard computer packages and they have been 
used in empirical research before, at least a brief comparison is useful for practical policy 
analysis. We nevertheless prefer structural modeling a priori because it is based on the utility 
theoretic basis of individual behavior. 
Here, the hazard rate is defined as the probability of applying for SSDI benefits once a 
work limiting condition first begins to bother the worker. Note that this probability is time-
dependent, it is conditional on not having applied earlier, and the spell starts when the worker 
becomes eligible. An interval hazard that controls for unobserved heterogeneity is used to 
estimate the transition to SSDI application. The unobserved heterogeneity, due to omitted 
variables or differences in the distribution functions across individuals, is integrated out of the 
likelihood function by assuming a log normal form. We define tWln  as the logarithm of the 
current earnings in the no application state. tLnD  is the natural logarithm of a weighted average 
of current income in the “applied and rejected” and “applied and accepted” states, where the 
weights are based on the probability of acceptance, i.e. ]*))(1(*)(ln[ln ttt YtBtD αα −+= . The 
variable we use in the hazard model is the difference }ln{ln tt DW − .  
The last columns in Tables 5 and 6 show the predicted application rates using the hazard 
model14. The hazard model predicts the first period application relatively well for men. However, 
it overestimates the application rates for almost all other periods as the economic and policy 
incentives are captured only indirectly. Moreover, uncertainty about the future is not fully 
modeled. The multinomial likelihood ratio test statistic is 74.2 for men and 62.9 for women for 
the in-sample predictions and the option value models fit better than the hazard model. 
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Conclusions 
In this paper, we model the timing of SSDI applications. We do so using two dynamic 
structural models, option value and dynamic programming. These models enable us not only to 
describe but also to explain how timing to SSDI application is affected by both health conditions 
and policy variables.  
We then investigate whether the results from the estimated models differ qualitatively or 
quantitatively. The aim is to see which of these models performs better in terms of predictive 
performance. The measure we use to evaluate the predictive performance is a multinomial 
likelihood ratio test based on the difference between the optimal timing predictions and the life 
table application rates. Our predictive power comparisons using both in-sample and out-of-
sample data show that the option value model performs better than the dynamic programming 
model in terms of predictive power even though it may be less consistent with theoretical 
individual behavior. In addition, its computational simplicity is an advantage over the dynamic 
programming approach. Nevertheless, dynamic programming is clearly theoretically preferred in 
terms of allowing for a more complete model including several other issues such as savings, 
appeals, return to work, transitions from SSDI into retirement, etc. 
All our models underestimate the risk of an “immediate” application following the onset. 
This suggests that for a significant subset of our sample unobserved severity of a work limitation 
may be limiting their choice of timing over and above the observed health measures. However, 
our results also show that while the severity of a work limiting health condition significantly 
affects the timing of SSDI applications, as do policy variables such as employer accommodation 
and the relative value of income in the application state to income in the work state. We conclude 
that while the road to disability benefit status begins with a health condition, the SSDI 
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application decision is affected by the personal and economic characteristics of individuals, as 
well as by government policies and labor market conditions they face.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, by Gender 
Variables Men Women 
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. 
Spell length 4.035 3.751 3.469 2.905 
Age at onset 45.326 9.624 45.201 8.905 
SSA records available 0.833 0.373 0.805 0.396 
Marital status 0.829 0.376 0.673 0.469 
White 0.708 0.455 0.692 0.462 
Black 0.194 0.396 0.221 0.415 
Other Race 0.098 0.298 0.087 0.282 
Education 11.059 3.467 11.487 2.580 
White collar 0.149 0.356 0.134 0.341 
Employer accommodation 0.270 0.444 0.266 0.442 
Two Conditions 0.289 0.454 0.314 0.465 
Three Conditions 0.177 0.382 0.191 0.393 
Arthritis 0.084 0.278 0.172 0.378 
Cardiovascular 0.287 0.453 0.105 0.307 
Musculoskeletal 0.395 0.489 0.424 0.495 
Other health condition 0.233 0.423 0.298 0.458 
SSDI Allowance Ratea     
Period 1 0.375 0.065 0.369 0.063 
Period 5 0.378 0.066 0.373 0.063 
Period 10 0.371 0.059 0.375 0.063 
Period 15 0.368 0.061 0.371 0.049 
Expected Earningsa,b     
No application     
Period 1 4.182 3.381 1.816 1.900 
Period 5 3.626 2.908 1.789 1.822 
Period 10 3.230 2.578 1.713 1.740 
Period 15 2.713 2.175 1.591 1.582 
Applied and Rejected     
Period 1 2.005 1.515 1.033 1.045 
Period 5 1.675 1.236 1.024 0.995 
Period 10 1.538 1.128 0.963 0.936 
Period 15 1.381 1.037 0.893 0.840 
Applied and Accepted     
Period 1 0.797 0.852 0.533 0.865 
Period 5 0.672 0.719 0.476 0.677 
Period 10 0.611 0.708 0.385 0.552 
Period 15 0.508 0.634 0.337 0.398 
Expected Benefitsa,b     
Period 1 2.071 0.708 1.154 0.491 
Period 5 2.132 0.699 1.198 0.509 
Period 10 2.204 0.691 1.309 0.493 
Period 15 2.082 0.718 1.221 0.533 
Number of Observations 592 493 
a Number of periods elapsed since the first period of eligibility after the onset of a work 
limiting health condition. 
bAll monetary values are in $1,000 (1967 dollars). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using HRS data.
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Table 2: Distribution of Spell Length 
 Men (N=592) Women (N=493) 
Spell   Hazard Survival Estimated   Hazard Survival Estimated
length Apply Censor rate rate pmf Apply Censor rate rate pmf
1 159 47 0.280 1.000 0.280 123 46 0.262 1.000 0.262
2 61 34 0.165 0.720 0.119 50 35 0.163 0.738 0.120
3 30 21 0.107 0.601 0.064 22 30 0.098 0.618 0.061
4 24 33 0.107 0.537 0.058 18 29 0.104 0.557 0.058
5 13 15 0.074 0.479 0.036 12 25 0.094 0.499 0.047
6 16 13 0.108 0.444 0.048 11 17 0.116 0.452 0.053
7 11 11 0.091 0.396 0.036 10 15 0.148 0.399 0.059
8 7 11 0.071 0.360 0.026 3 12 0.068 0.340 0.023
9 6 11 0.075 0.334 0.025 8 5 0.246 0.317 0.078
10 6 10 0.094 0.309 0.029 1 5 0.051 0.239 0.012
11 4 10 0.083 0.280 0.023 4 2 0.267 0.227 0.060
12 4 7 0.113 0.257 0.029 0 1 0.000 0.166 0.000
13 1 5 0.039 0.228 0.009 1 3 0.133 0.166 0.022
14 2 9 0.114 0.219 0.025 0 3 0.000 0.144 0.000
15 3 4 0.333 0.194 0.065 0 2 0.000 0.144 0.000
16 0 4 0.000 0.129 0.000 0 0 0.000 0.144 0.000
Total 347 245      263 230      
Note: The hazard and survival rates correspond to Kaplan-Meier estimates of the time to application for SSDI. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using HRS data. 
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Table 3: Estimation Results for Men (N=592) 
 Dynamic Programming Option Value 
Parameter Normal Normal Weibull 
κ 1.431 1.509 0.384 
 (7.706) (12.145) (3.617) 
β 0.850* 0.850* 0.850* 
γ 0.407 0.456 0.585 
 (6.093) (9.045) (4.626) 
Education 0.081 0.238 0.114 
 (2.443) (11.408) (2.493) 
Marrieda -0.125 0.035 -0.198 
 (-4.276) (1.908) (-3.987) 
Blackb -0.132 -0.102 -0.253 
  (-4.164) (-5.331) (-5.259) 
Accommodation 0.093 0.100 0.256 
 (3.711) (5.522) (5.069) 
White Collar 0.008 0.004 0.062 
 (0.237) (0.169) (0.986) 
Arthritisc 0.075 0.167 0.179 
 (1.687) (5.665) (2.018) 
Cardiovascularc -0.119 -0.086 -0.259 
 (-3.225) (-4.089) (-4.771) 
Musculoskeletalc 0.016 0.057 0.061 
 (0.550) (3.082) (1.215) 
- log Likelihood -1,054.871 -1,108.966 -1,058.458 
Note: κ is the relative value of income in the non-work state to income in the work state, γ is risk aversion  
parameter of the utility function (with respect to income variability) where the coefficient of relative risk  
aversion=γ-1, and β is the discount factor. 
* denotes the parameters that are set outside the model. T-values are in parentheses. All monetary  
values are in $1,000 (1967 dollars). 
a The reference category is single.  
b The reference category is all other races including white race. 
c The reference category is all other health conditions. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using HRS data. 
 
 38
 
Table 4: Estimation Results for Women (N=493) 
 Dynamic Programming Option Value 
Parameter Normal Normal Weibull 
κ 2.123 2.007 1.798 
 (7.334) (25.598) (9.807) 
β 0.850* 0.850* 0.850* 
γ 0.520 1.678 1.046 
 (3.211) (22.708) (7.414) 
Education 0.068 0.114 0.102 
 (1.739) (4.047) (1.841) 
Marrieda 0.002 0.024 0.041 
 (0.063) (1.266) (0.832) 
Blackb -0.186 -0.080 -0.306 
 (-4.642) (-3.842) (-5.495) 
Accommodation 0.074 0.042 0.080 
 (2.618) (2.194) (1.595) 
White Collar 0.089 0.067 0.193 
 (2.447) (2.398) (2.693) 
Arthritisc 0.030 0.042 0.098 
 (0.758) (1.748) (1.593) 
Cardiovascularc 0.015 0.016 -0.014 
 (0.268) (0.538) (-0.176) 
Musculoskeletalc 0.117 0.091 0.263 
 (3.660) (4.551) (5.166) 
- log Likelihood -848.340 -854.105 -884.685 
Note: κ is the relative value of income in the non-work state to income in the work state, γ is risk aversion  
parameter of the utility function (with respect to income variability) where the coefficient of relative risk  
aversion=γ-1, and β is the discount factor. 
* denotes the parameters that are set outside the model. T-values are in parentheses. All monetary  
values are in $1,000 (1967 dollars). 
a The reference category is single.  
b The reference category is all other races including white race. 
c The reference category is all other health conditions. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using HRS data. 
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Table 5: Application Rates for Men (N=592) 
 Dynamic Programming Option Value N Option Value W Hazard 
Period Predicted Difference Predicted Difference Predicted Difference Predicted Difference
1 0.143 0.137 0.192 0.088 0.152 0.128 0.165 0.115 
2 0.116 0.004 0.128 -0.009 0.116 0.003 0.128 -0.009 
3 0.099 -0.035 0.098 -0.034 0.101 -0.037 0.103 -0.039 
4 0.077 -0.019 0.071 -0.013 0.078 -0.020 0.088 -0.030 
5 0.059 -0.023 0.052 -0.016 0.061 -0.026 0.077 -0.041 
6 0.045 0.003 0.042 0.006 0.051 -0.003 0.069 -0.021 
7 0.032 0.004 0.029 0.007 0.037 -0.001 0.062 -0.026 
8 0.024 0.001 0.022 0.003 0.029 -0.004 0.058 -0.032 
9 0.019 0.006 0.018 0.007 0.025 0.000 0.051 -0.026 
10 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.021 0.008 0.048 -0.019 
11 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.016 0.007 0.044 -0.021 
12 0.008 0.021 0.010 0.019 0.014 0.015 0.039 -0.011 
13 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.011 -0.002 0.030 -0.021 
14 0.005 0.020 0.008 0.017 0.010 0.015 0.021 0.004 
15 0.004 0.061 0.006 0.059 0.007 0.057 0.011 0.053 
never apply 0.333 -0.203 0.284 -0.155 0.262 -0.133 0.000 0.129 
Test of predicted versus life table distributions of time to application:  
Test statistica 63.296 41.701 39.513 74.239 
Note: Dynamic programming model is the model estimated under normality assumption. Option Value N and 
Option Value W refer to the models with normal distribution and Weibull distribution assumptions, 
respectively. The last two columns show the hazard model results. 
a The test statistics shown are multinomial likelihood ratio statistics for the null hypothesis that the discrete 
distribution of time to application in Table 2 estimated using life table techniques is equal to the fitted distributions 
resulting from the models in this table. Critical chi-square values are 24.996 (0.05) and 30.578 (0.01). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using HRS data. 
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Table 6: Application Rates for Women (N=493) 
 Dynamic Programming Option Value N Option Value W Hazard 
Period Predicted Difference Predicted Difference Predicted Difference Predicted Difference
1 0.133 0.129 0.141 0.121 0.134 0.127 0.136 0.126 
2 0.112 0.008 0.117 0.003 0.112 0.008 0.119 0.002 
3 0.097 -0.036 0.102 -0.041 0.101 -0.040 0.106 -0.045 
4 0.080 -0.022 0.081 -0.023 0.085 -0.027 0.097 -0.039 
5 0.060 -0.013 0.062 -0.015 0.063 -0.016 0.091 -0.044 
6 0.048 0.005 0.051 0.002 0.054 -0.002 0.085 -0.033 
7 0.037 0.022 0.040 0.019 0.043 0.016 0.082 -0.022 
8 0.028 -0.005 0.032 -0.009 0.035 -0.012 0.075 -0.052 
9 0.023 0.055 0.027 0.051 0.030 0.048 0.067 0.011 
10 0.017 -0.004 0.020 -0.008 0.022 -0.010 0.056 -0.044 
11 0.013 0.048 0.016 0.044 0.018 0.043 0.043 0.018 
never apply 0.325 -0.181 0.276 -0.132 0.260 -0.116 0.000 0.144 
Test of predicted versus life table distributions of time to application:  
Test statistica 41.461 29.516 26.505 62.940 
Note: Dynamic programming model is the model estimated under normality assumption. Option Value N and 
Option Value W refer to the models with normal distribution and Weibull distribution assumptions, respectively. 
The last two columns show the hazard model results. 
a The test statistics shown are multinomial likelihood ratio statistics for the null hypothesis that the discrete 
distribution of time to application in Table 2 estimated using life table techniques is equal to the fitted distributions 
resulting from the models in this table. Critical chi-square values are 19.675 (0.05) and 24.725 (0.01). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using HRS data. 
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Table 7: Application Rates for Men, Out-of-Sample Predictions (N=197) 
 Dynamic Programming Option Value N Option Value W 
Period Predicted Difference Predicted Difference Predicted Difference 
1 0.135 0.131 0.174 0.092 0.139 0.127 
2 0.109 0.014 0.118 0.005 0.106 0.017 
3 0.094 -0.019 0.093 -0.019 0.096 -0.022 
4 0.070 -0.023 0.064 -0.016 0.070 -0.023 
5 0.056 -0.019 0.048 -0.011 0.058 -0.020 
6 0.044 0.006 0.041 0.009 0.050 0.001 
7 0.033 -0.003 0.030 0.001 0.041 -0.011 
8 0.026 0.008 0.024 0.009 0.031 0.002 
9 0.020 0.005 0.019 0.006 0.025 0.000 
10 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.021 0.008 
11 0.011 0.017 0.011 0.017 0.015 0.013 
12 0.008 0.039 0.009 0.039 0.012 0.036 
never apply 0.349 -0.226 0.311 -0.188 0.289 -0.166 
Test of predicted versus life table distributions of time to application:  
Test statistica 24.140 17.508 16.700 
Note: Dynamic programming model is the model estimated under normality assumption. Option Value N  
and Option Value W refer to the models with normal distribution and Weibull distribution assumptions,  
respectively.  
a The test statistics shown are multinomial likelihood ratio statistics for the null hypothesis that the discrete  
distribution of time to application in Appendix Table 3A estimated using life table techniques is equal to 
the fitted distributions resulting from the models in this table. Critical chi-square values are 21.026 (0.05) 
and 26.217 (0.01). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using HRS data. 
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Table 8: Application Rates for Women, Out-of-Sample Predictions (N=164) 
 Dynamic Programming Option Value N Option Value W 
Period Predicted Difference Predicted Difference Predicted Difference 
1 0.146 0.121 0.153 0.114 0.154 0.113 
2 0.120 0.013 0.125 0.007 0.126 0.006 
3 0.100 -0.039 0.105 -0.043 0.107 -0.046 
4 0.080 -0.027 0.081 -0.029 0.088 -0.036 
5 0.057 -0.017 0.062 -0.022 0.064 -0.024 
6 0.044 0.032 0.049 0.027 0.051 0.025 
7 0.034 0.025 0.038 0.021 0.040 0.019 
8 0.023 -0.002 0.028 -0.008 0.029 -0.008 
9 0.020 0.058 0.025 0.052 0.027 0.051 
10 0.016 -0.001 0.022 -0.006 0.023 -0.007 
11 0.012 0.063 0.016 0.059 0.017 0.058 
never apply 0.323 -0.223 0.263 -0.164 0.234 -0.134 
Test of predicted versus life table distributions of time to application:  
Test statistica 20.858 14.701 12.262 
Note: Dynamic programming model is the model estimated under normality assumption. Option Value N  
and Option Value W refer to the models with normal distribution and Weibull distribution assumptions,  
respectively. 
a The test statistics shown are multinomial likelihood ratio statistics for the null hypothesis that the discrete  
distribution of time to application in Appendix Table 3A estimated using life table techniques is equal to 
the fitted distributions resulting from the models in this table. Critical chi-square values are 19.675 (0.05) 
and 24.725 (0.01). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using HRS data. 
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Appendix Tables 
 
Appendix Table 1A: In-Sample Estimation Results for Men (N=395) 
 Dynamic Programming Option Value 
Parameter Normal Normal Weibull 
κ 1.449 1.237 0.354 
 (6.327) (10.504) (2.158) 
β 0.850* 0.850* 0.850* 
γ 0.437 0.596 0.820 
 (5.262) (10.475) (5.397) 
Education 0.113 0.267 0.184 
 (2.618) (10.216) (3.130) 
Marrieda -0.121 -0.002 -0.190 
  (-3.256) (-0.061) (-3.128) 
Blackb -0.092 -0.108 -0.260 
 (-2.462) (-4.506) (-4.300) 
Accommodation 0.134 0.153 0.357 
 (4.411) (6.210) (5.334) 
White Collar 0.050 0.029 0.073 
 (1.036) (0.946) (0.876) 
Arthritisc 0.001 0.138 0.182 
 (0.023) (3.475) (1.602) 
Cardiovascularc -0.223 -0.165 -0.378 
 (-4.689) (-5.755)  (-5.469) 
Musculoskeletalc -0.013 -0.003 -0.013 
 (-0.334) (-0.097)  (-0.199) 
- log Likelihood -687.170 -720.098 -681.095 
Note: κ is the relative value of income in the non-work state to income in the work state, γ is risk  
aversion parameter of the utility function (with respect to income variability) where the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion=γ-1, and β is the discount factor. 
* denotes the parameters that are set outside the model. T-values are in parentheses. All monetary  
values are in $1,000 (1967 dollars). 
a The reference category is single.  
b The reference category is all other races including white race. 
c The reference category is all other health conditions. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using HRS data. 
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Appendix Table 2A: In-Sample Estimation Results for Women (N=329) 
 Dynamic Programming Option Value 
Parameter Normal Normal Weibull 
κ 2.000 2.003 1.994 
 (5.440) (22.359) (6.160) 
β 0.850* 0.850* 0.850* 
γ 0.446 1.705 0.818 
 (2.477) (17.804) (5.574) 
Education 0.010 0.085 0.093 
 (0.189) (2.396) (1.366) 
Marrieda -0.011 0.022 0.033 
  (-0.275) (0.935) (0.547) 
Blackb -0.178 -0.057 -0.265 
 (-3.584) (-2.182) (-3.812) 
Accommodation 0.097 0.049 0.099 
 (2.743) (2.137) (1.664) 
White Collar 0.150 0.094 0.260 
 (3.290) (2.911) (3.160) 
Arthritisc 0.057 0.048 0.120 
 (1.069) (1.575) (1.568) 
Cardiovascularc 0.000 0.030 0.046 
 (-0.001) (0.834) (0.505) 
Musculoskeletalc 0.141 0.079 0.243 
 (3.231) (3.164) (3.830) 
- log Likelihood -573.168 -585.430 -601.594 
Note: κ is the relative value of income in the non-work state to income in the work state, γ is risk  
aversion parameter of the utility function (with respect to income variability) where the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion=γ-1, and β is the discount factor. 
* denotes the parameters that are set outside the model. T-values are in parentheses. All monetary  
values are in $1,000 (1967 dollars). 
a The reference category is single.  
b The reference category is all other races including white race. 
c The reference category is all other health conditions. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using HRS data. 
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Appendix Table 3A: Distribution of Spell Length (In-Sample) 
 Men (N=395) Women (N=329) 
Spell   Hazard Survival Estimated   Hazard Survival Estimated
length Apply Censor rate rate pmf Apply Censor rate rate pmf
1 101 30 0.266 1.000 0.266 84 29 0.267 1.000 0.267
2 42 27 0.168 0.734 0.123 37 23 0.181 0.733 0.133
3 23 13 0.122 0.611 0.075 15 19 0.102 0.600 0.061
4 13 23 0.088 0.537 0.047 11 18 0.097 0.539 0.052
5 9 10 0.076 0.489 0.037 7 15 0.082 0.486 0.040
6 11 11 0.112 0.452 0.050 11 13 0.171 0.447 0.076
7 6 6 0.076 0.401 0.030 7 6 0.159 0.370 0.059
8 6 6 0.090 0.371 0.033 2 8 0.067 0.311 0.021
9 4 8 0.074 0.338 0.025 6 3 0.267 0.291 0.078
10 4 8 0.095 0.313 0.030 1 3 0.074 0.213 0.016
11 3 7 0.098 0.283 0.028 4 1 0.381 0.197 0.075
12 4 5 0.186 0.255 0.047 0 0 0.000 0.122 0.022
13 0 4 0.000 0.208 0.000 1 1 0.182 0.122 0.000
14 1 4 0.111 0.208 0.023 0 3 0.000 0.100 0.000
15 2 0 0.333 0.185 0.062 0 1 0.000 0.100 0.000
16 0 4 0.000 0.123 0.000 0 0 0.000 0.100 0.000
Total 229 166     186 143     
Note: The hazard and survival rates correspond to Kaplan-Meier estimates of the time to application for SSDI. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using HRS data. 
 
 46
 
Appendix Table 4A: Hazard model estimates 
 Men Women 
Variables Coefficient T-Value Coefficient T-Value 
     
Constant -4.973 -5.383 -4.794 -3.980 
(lnWt- lnDt)a -0.255 -4.331 -0.105 -1.191 
Age at onset 9.107 5.540 8.353 4.326 
Married -0.017 -0.084 -0.056 -0.289 
Education -6.200 -2.380 -6.068 -1.497 
Black b 0.486 2.284 0.529 2.086 
Other Race b 0.705 2.520 0.406 1.112 
Two conditions c 0.321 1.785 0.710 3.026 
Three conditions c 0.565 2.433 0.923 3.132 
Arthritis d -0.712 -2.117 -0.546 -2.057 
Cardiovascular conditions d 0.085 0.404 -0.030 -0.099 
Musculoskeletal conditions d -0.505 -2.416 -0.754 -3.092 
White collar -0.139 -0.593 -0.472 -1.443 
Employer Accommodation -0.625 -3.051 -0.421 -1.905 
SSA records missing -0.485 -2.228 -0.707 -2.522 
Time -0.096 -0.727 -0.004 -0.023 
Time square 0.016 2.190 0.016 1.461 
Variance of Heterogeneity 0.832 0.973 1.127 1.112 
Log-Likelihood 842.21 640.42 
Sample Size 592 493 
a We define Wt  as the logarithm of the current earnings in the no application state. Dt  is the natural logarithm 
of a weighted average of current income in the “applied and rejected” and “applied and accepted” states, where 
the weights are based on the probability of acceptance. 
b Reference group is white race. 
c Reference group is one health condition at onset of a disability. 
d Reference group is all other types of health conditions. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on the HRS data. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 See Bound and Burkhauser (1999) for a review of this literature. See Burkhauser et al. (2002) 
for a more recent discussion of the employment rates of working age people with disabilities. 
2 This paper focuses on the decision to apply for SSDI by workers who experience a work 
limiting health condition at ages well below normal retirement age. To simplify our model, we 
abstract from the decision to apply for OASI or SSDI at age 62 and assume that workers who 
have not applied for SSDI benefits by age 62 will apply for OASI benefits at 62. This is a 
simplified model of a labor market exit behavior that ignores the periods after age 62. A fuller 
model would integrate OASI and SSDI into a model of labor market exit. But this consideration 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
3 Note that, one could also follow an alternative modeling strategy by parameterizing the 
probability of acceptance. This probability can be modeled as an unobserved individual specific 
variable instead of the random utility framework we set up here in this paper.  
4 A data appendix which includes detailed information on the data sets used and a discussion of 
the construction of the variables used in the analysis is available from the authors upon request. 
It is also contained in Gumus (2002). 
5 We draw our samples from the first two waves and use only earnings data from the third wave. 
6 These restricted access records can be obtained under certain conditions from the HRS staff at 
the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan. See 
http://www.umich.edu/~hrswww/ for more information. 
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7 One would, of course, ideally use allowance rates which depend also on some individual 
characteristics, in particular on the type and severity of the health condition. However, such data 
are not available to the best of our knowledge. 
8 See Lewin Group (1995) for further details. Burkhauser et al. (2002) also use these variables at 
the state level in a reduced form hazard model of SSDI application.  
9 In our empirical study, we include both primary and secondary respondents. Note that the 
secondary respondents are not a random sample representative of their age cohort, they were 
sampled because they were married to an age eligible primary respondent. Since husbands tend 
to be older than their wives, in the HRS, there are many more men aged 62 and over than there 
are women. The sample is not representative of the population but sampling is not based on 
application for SSDI so sampling weights are not needed for our purposes. 
10 Note that Dd and all other incomes represented here depend on many factors related both to 
individuals and to the pattern of application. We take those factors into account in our analysis 
but omit the list of conditioning variables in order to describe the model in a less complex way. 
A fuller discussion is provided in the unpublished data appendix (see Gumus, 2002). 
11 Note that except the estimated κ in the Weibull version of the option value model for men, the 
parameter values we obtain are in line with results from previous studies by LSW (1992 and 
1997) and Ausink and Wise (1996). In these studies, the value of γ ranges between 0.5 and 1.8, 
and κ takes values between 1.3 and 3.6. 
12 Following Stock and Wise (1990b), we consider a gamble of receiving $10,000 or $20,000 
each with .5 probability, thus the expected amount is $15,000. The certainty equivalent is the 
amount that would be accepted instead of the uncertain amount. Using our estimates of γ and 
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holding everything else constant, we calculate the certainty equivalent as $14,589, $15,560, and 
$15,039 for the dynamic programming, the normal option value, and the Weibull option value 
models, respectively. These amounts are not very different from the expected amount of 
$15,000, hence we argue that the individuals in our sample are, in fact, close to being risk neutral 
with respect to income variability even though the estimated value of the risk aversion parameter 
of the utility function takes different values in each model. The certainty equivalent amounts for 
men are $14,491, $14,533, and $14,644 respectively. See Gumus (2002) for more details. 
13 Estimated coefficients for in-sample estimation are presented in Appendix Tables 1A and 2A. 
14 Estimated coefficients of the hazard model are presented in Appendix Table 4A. 
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